Florida Journal of International Law
Volume 23

Issue 2

Article 4

August 2011

United States National Space Policy, 2006 & 2010
Todd Barnet

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil

Recommended Citation
Barnet, Todd (2011) "United States National Space Policy, 2006 & 2010," Florida Journal of International
Law: Vol. 23: Iss. 2, Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol23/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Barnet: United States National Space Policy, 2006 & 2010

UNITED STATES NATIONAL SPACE POLICY, 2006 & 2010
Todd Barnet*
.................................

.......

277

........

278

...............

280

I.

INTRODUCTION

II.

BEGINNING OF THE SPACE RACE & THE

III.

THE

IV.

........ 282
U.S. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY, 2006 & 2010 ........
..... 282
....
.............
A. NationalSpace Policy 2006
.................. 284
B. NationalSpace Policy 2010....

V.

THREATS IN SPACE, BUT No IMMEDIATE AGGRESSION..............286

VI.

SUGGESTION: AMEND THE OST

OST.....

OST & THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE ...

..............

..........

288

VII. CONCLUSION..........................................291

I. INTRODUCTION

In January of 1967, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies-colloquially
the Outer Space Treaty (OST).' This treaty entered into legal effect in
October 1967, and serves as the foundation for the international law of
outer space. In fact, the OST is so central to the law of outer space that
it has been called the "Magna Carta" of space law. 2 It includes certain
basic principles to which all the signatory nations agreed to abide,
including freedom of exploration, space as the province of all mankind,
and restrictions on military use of space.
*

Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Pace University; J.D., Brooklyn Law School,
A.B. University of Southern California. Thanks to Adrian Griffiths for his advice, research and
editing assistance.
1. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
2. Major Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the FinalFrontier: The Law of War in
Space, 48 A.F. L. REv. 1, 74 (2000). The Outer Space Treaty has also been referred to as the
"constitution" of space. Ram Jakhu, Legal Issues Relating to the GlobalPublic Interest in Outer
Space, 32 J. SPACE L. 31, 33 (2006).
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Although not part of the construct of international law, the
framework of space law in the United States is largely informed by
presidential space policy directives. Every U.S. president since
Eisenhower has set policy objectives related to the exploration and use
of space, encompassing both civilian and military goals. In August
2006, President George W. Bush issued a controversial policy directive
that asserted a right for the United States to defend its national interests
in space, to exclude any state the United States views as an immediate
or potential threat, and implied a right to create a strong military
presence. The 2006 space policy directive authorized the United States
to unilaterally determine which nations should be barred from space, for
what reasons, and when. In June 2010, President Barack Obama issued
a new space policy directive that ameliorated many of the problems
associated with the 2006 policy. Although the 2010 policy still
authorizes the United States to protect its national interests in space, it is
less aggressive and calls for cooperation and transparency (principles
largely lost in the 2006 space policy).
This Article critically examines and compares the 2006 and 2010
U.S. national space policies within the framework of the OST, and
provides certain suggestions for enhancing the international law of outer
space. It is divided into five parts. Part II briefly outlines the history of
the OST and the space race that it was meant to curtail. Part III explores
the limitations that the OST has put on the militarization of space and
builds a picture of the current militarization of space. Part IV examines
the policy differences between the 2006 and 2010 presidential space
directives. Part V assesses the potential threats against U.S. military and
civilian space systems. Lastly, Part VI proposes amending the OST to
accommodate the current technological and political environment.
II. BEGINNING OF THE SPACE RACE & THE OST

On October 4, 1957, the U.S.S.R. shocked the world by launching
the world's first artificial satellite, "Sputnik 1," into orbit around the
Earth, eclipsing U.S. ambition to do the same.3 The resulting hysteria in
the United States propelled American desire to ramp up its own space
program, and the ensuing space race pitted the United States against the
U.S.S.R. in a competition for the national pride and international
4
prestige associated with dominance in space.
In 1959, the U.N. General Assembly created the instrumental
3.

R. Cargill Hall, National Space Policy and Its Interaction with the U.S. Military

Space Program, in MILITARY SPACE AND NATIONAL POLICY: RECORD AND INTERPRETATION 1, 3

(George Marshall Institute, 2006), availableat http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/419.pdf.
4. Id. at 5.
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Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) to draft a
unified body of international space law. 5 The result was five treaties that
form the bedrock of space law. 6 By far the most important of these
treaties was the OST. By 1967, when the OST was signed, the Cold
War was in full bloom. Political tension was high, and the United States
and the U.S.S.R. each worried that the other would outfit new satellite
technology with nuclear missiles with potentially devastating effects.7
In addition, the United States feared that its intelligence satellites might
become vulnerable to Soviet attack. During the Cold War, the United
States relied heavily on intelligence gathered by reconnaissance aircraft
such as the high-altitude U-2, but improving Soviet anti-air defenses put
American U-2s at risk. 9 Intelligence satellites would be beyond the
reach of Soviet anti-air defenses, but the United States realized that
technological progression would make even satellites vulnerable, unless
they were protected by international agreement.' 0
The OST was designed in large part to protect United States and
Soviet assets in space, to curtail the space race that began with the
launching of the Sputnik satellite, and to ease the political tensions
associated with man's foray into space." In order to stave off an
imminent space arms race, the OST established that space-"the
province of all mankind"-was to be utilized for "peaceful purposes"
It also
and "for the benefit and in the interests of all countries.'
established certain specific restrictions on potential military uses of
space: nuclear weapons, and all other weapons of mass destruction were
strictly prohibited in space, and military bases were prohibited on
celestial bodies, as was the testing of weapons and conduct of military
exercises. 3

5. Initially formed as an ad hoc committee, COPUOS was formally established in 1959
by a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly. International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1472, 1 14, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Dec. 12,
1959).
6. In addition to the Outer Space Treaty, COPUOS drafted the 1968 Rescue Agreement,
the 1972 Liability Convention, the 1975 Registration Convention, and the 1979 Moon Treaty.
7. Jacob M. Harper, Development, Technology, Politics, and the New Space Race: The
Legality and Desirability of Bush's National Space Policy under the Public and Customary
InternationalLaws ofSpace, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 681, 682-83 (2008).
8. Hall, supra note 3, at 3.
9. Id. at 1-3.

10. Id. at 3.
11. See Ty S. Twibell, Space Law: Legal Restraints on Commercialization &
Development of Outer Space, 65 UMKC L. REv. 589, 591-94 (1997).
12. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, arts. I, IV.
13. Id. art. IV.
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III. THE OST & THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE

Despite the restrictions on military presence in space, however, the
OST, on its face, does not prohibit all military space systems.14 Article
IV of the OST prohibits any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in
space: "States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit
around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other
kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial
bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner."1 5
Article IV of the OST prohibits the establishment of military
installations, weapons testing, and military exercises on celestial
bodies.1 6 It provides: "The establishment of military bases, installations
and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of
military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden." 7 The OST
does not, however, 8 rohibit the presence of non-WMD armaments in
orbit around Earth.' Similarly, the OST does not prohibit nations from
establishing extra-planetary military bases, although the current utility
of such bases is questionable.
Perhaps such installations would violate the concept of space as the
"province of all mankind" to be used for "peaceful purposes." However,
given that the OST contains specific provisions pertaining to the
militarization of space, it is difficult to read these vague concepts as
eschewing all forms of military presence in space. Moreover, at the time
the OST was signed, the United States already had military intelligence
satellites in space. Indeed, protecting those satellites was a major part of
the impetus for the United States signing the OST in the first place. 19
Since then, many more military and dual-use satellites have been
launched. Therefore, it is hard to argue that "peaceful purposes"
eschews all military presence, but that does not mean that all military
presence in space not specifically disallowed under Article IV is
permissible. The official U.S. position has always been that peaceful
means "non-aggressive," 20 and as we shall see, this concept has been
stretched, perhaps beyond recognition, in recent U.S. space policy.
14. Major John W. Bellflower, The Influence of Law on Command of Space, 65 A.F. L.
REV. 107, 127-28 (2010) (arguing that Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty only prohibits
certain means of military force in space).
15. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Bellflower, supra note 14, at 127.
19. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
20. Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto & Steven Freeland, The 21st Century Space Arms Race:
CurtailingHeavenly Thunderbolts Through the Shield of the 'Peaceful Purposes' Mantra, 10
(Feb. 26, 2010) (working paper), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract
id=1559840.
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Whatever the meaning of "peaceful purposes" in the OST, the
militarization of space has taken off in recent years. The Gulf War was
labeled the first "space war" because of the strategic use of tactical
intelligence, meteorological and geodetic data, and communications via
satellite.2 1 Until recently, perhaps due to the high cost factor, few
nations other than the United States and Russia have invested heavily in
their own military space programs. Now other nations appear concerned
about the potential for being dominated in space. In 2007, China
successfully tested an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) that it had been
develo ing, shooting down an old weather satellite in orbit around
Earth. Seemingly in response to the Chinese launch of a satellite into
space, India has begun looking at military options in space. 23 In 2008,
Japan authorized military use of space as part of an ambitious space
program, breaking a decades old ban on the use of the nation's space
assets for military purposes. 2 4 In addition, Germany has recently
commissioned its first spy satellites. 25
Still, there are currently no known offensive space weapons. Despite
the aggressive stance of the United States in recent years, U.S. military
space policy has always been focused on intelligence gathering,
navigation, communications, and missile early warning (perhaps due to
the cost, both economic and political, of putting weapons in space).
However, while it may be costly to actually install weapons on satellites
(rather than just using space-based support in conjunction with
terrestrial weapons systems), there are strategic considerations that
might justify the expense. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld has dubbed space the "ultimate high ground," in reference to
the militar ' maxim that he who controls the high ground controls the
battlefield. As technology advances, the economic (though not
political) cost of such installations will go down, making the offensive
weaponization of space a real possibility in the near future, and one that
should be dealt with now.
The United States has resisted measures intended to prevent an arms
race in space. The U.N. General Assembly has passed numerous
resolutions for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, to which
the United States has traditionally abstained and recently voted
21. Hall, supra note 3, at 16.
22. Maogoto & Freeland, supranote 20, at 2.
23. David A. Koplow, ASAT-isfaction: Customary InternationalLaw and the Regulation
ofAnti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1187, 1193 (2009).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. U.S. Sec'y of Def. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Testimony prepared for the S. Armed
Services Comm. hearing on 2003 Def. Budget Request (Feb. 5, 2002), at 24, available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2002_hr/Rumsfeld.pdf
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against. 27 As we will see in Part IV infra, the U.S. decision to oppose
the arms race resolutions was in keeping with U.S. policy measures that
strongly disfavored any impediment to U.S. ambitions in space (military
or otherwise). But new U.S. policy has perhaps set the tone for new
discussions.

IV. U.S.

NATIONAL SPACE POLICY,

2006 & 2010

A. National Space Policy 2006
In August 2006, President Bush issued his presidential directive on
National Space Policy (NSP06).2 8 In particularly dramatic language,
NSPO6 authorized the United States to actively defend its interests in
space, and to deny access to space to adverse nations that the United
States determined were using space in a way hostile to U.S. national
interests. 29 Unsurprisingly, NSPO6 was met with intense criticism and
caused an international uproar.3 0 In fact, China's subsequent decision to
test an anti-satellite missile in January 2007 is often considered a
response to the aggressive U.S. stance expressed by NSPO6.31 Russia,
the other primary rival to U.S. space power, along with China, has also
criticized the United States for the aggressive unilateral approach
espoused by NSP06. 32
To some extent, NSPO6 merely authorized the protection of rights
granted by the OST, in order to support the growing national interests of
the United States in space. 33 For instance, NSPO6 states that the United
States will "preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in
space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or
developing capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary
27. See G.A. Res. 60/54, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/54 (Dec. 8, 2005) (passed 180-2-0 with
the U.S. and Israel voting against); G.A. Res. 61/58, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/58 (Dec. 6, 2006)
(passed 178-1-1 with the U.S. as the sole vote against, and Israel abstaining); G.A. Res. 62/20,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/20 (Dec. 5, 2007) (passed 178-1-1 with the United States as the sole vote
against, and Israel abstaining).
28. U.S. National Space Policy, Aug. 31, 2006 [hereinafter NSPO6], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/national-space-policy-2006.pdf.
29. Id. at 1-2.
30. Cynthia B. Zhang, Do As I Say, Not As I do-Is Star Wars Inevitable? Exploring the
FutureofInternationalSpace Regime in the Context of the 2006 U.S. NationalSpace Policy, 34
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 422, 423 (2008) (arguing that the United States has taken a
unilateralist approach to the politics of outer space).
31. Harper, supra note 7, at 682.
32. Id. at 681-82.
33. NSPO6 provides: "The United States considers space capabilities-including the
ground and space segments and supporting links-vital to its national interests." NSPO6, supra
note 28, at 1.
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to protect its space capabilities; [and] respond to interference." 34
Freedom of action in space for all nations is one of the most central
tenets of the OST. Recall, Article I of the OST espouses the view of
space as the "province of all mankind" and provides that all states
should have free access to space without discrimination." NSPO6 also
states that "[t]he United States rejects any claims to sovereignty by any
nation over outer space or celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and
rejects any limitations on the fundamental right of the United States to
operate in and acquire data from space." 36 However, one must
remember that the OST already provides that space "is not subject to
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty."3 7 NSPO6 thus largely
asserts the power of the United States to protect rights already granted
by international treaty. Nevertheless, there is legitimate concern over
how the United States will protect these rights. Indeed, NSPO6 appears
to focus on the potential for using military force to protect U.S. national
interests in space, which is possibly a violation of the OST.
It is in no way surprising that an international space power, with a
growing interest and dependency on space, would want to protect those
interests. The OST, and the other international space treaties, do little to
ensure compliance-the OST only provides for "a consultation" if a
nation's interests are being interfered with. In full, the consultation
provision of the OST provides:
A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an
activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer
space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would
cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the
peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon
and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning
the activity or experiment.
The details of what a consultation constitutes are not fleshed out in
the OST, but it is clear that a mere consultation-without specific
punitive consequences-may be insufficient to remedy any actual
interference, or deter potential interference, with a nation's right to use
and explore space. The United States is thus naturally and legitimately
concerned with protecting its interests in outer space.
The most controversial language in NSPO6, however, potentially
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 1-2.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. I.
NSPO6, supra note 28, at 1.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. II.
Id. art. IX.
Id.
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goes far beyond protecting interests established under international law.
In particular, NSPO6 authorizes the United States to "deny, if necessary,
adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national
interests." 40 Enforcement of this directive necessarily involves military
power. The exclusion of a disfavored nation-state will implicitly require
the use of military force. Because the United States reserved the right to
determine who was an adversary, and what constitutes hostile use, this
directive comes into direct conflict with the OST principle that no
nation can exclude any other nation from space (the very same notion
that NSPO6 appeals to when it states that the United States will preserve
its own freedom of action in space). Recall Article I of the OST
provides that space "shall be free for exploration and use by all States
without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in
accordance with international law."41 The unilateral exclusion of a
nation from space is an invidious form of discrimination, and is
prohibited by the OST. Even if we were to construe the concept of
hostile adversaries in NSPO6 narrowly, the OST language explicitly
prohibits any kind of discrimination. Moreover, if the United States
were to act as the arbiter of who may be denied access to space, this
would violate the principle of equality, and would be a violation of
international law. The OST may allow a nation to be excluded from
space under certain circumstances, but if a unilateral decision by one
signatory nation is sufficient, then the freedom of action principle has
no meaning. And the fact that it was the United States asserting this
right, and not some other nation, hardly changes the analysis. Although
NSPO6 only asserted US. authority to exclude others from space, others
may claim this right by implication, potentially putting even U.S.
satellites at risk.
Furthermore, NSPO6 stated that the United States would oppose
arms control restrictions that "impair the rights of the United States to
conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other
activities in space for U.S. national interests." 2 While "national
interests" certainly encompasses defense, it arguably includes offense as
well. Indeed, offensive space systems may be required to implement the
policy directive to deny adversaries' use of space capabilities hostile to
U.S. national interests.
B. National Space Policy 2010
On June 28, 2010, President Barack Obama issued a new

40. NSPO6, supra note 28, at 2.
41. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. I (emphasis added).
42. NSPO6, supra note 28, at 2 (emphasis added).
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presidential directive on National Space Policy (NSP l0).43 While the
content of provisions in NSP10 relating to the authority of the United
States to defend its interests in space remain mostly the same as in
NSPO6, the tone of the directive is much more cooperative. NSP10
states, for instance, that the United States may, "consistent with the
inherent right of self-defense, deter others from interference and attack,
defend our space systems and contribute to the defense of allied,4 ace
By
systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack them.'
explicitly utilizing the language of self-defense, and by framing the
issue in terms of the defense of both U.S. and allied space systems, the
forceful and nationalistic tone of NSPO6 is replaced by a more moderate
NSP10. Moreover, NSP10 adds a new guiding principle of
transparency, and suggests that the United States may limit its
militarization of space to defense and deterrence.4 5
NSPl0 provides:
It is the shared interest of all nations to act responsibly in space to
help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust. . . . Space

operations should be conducted in ways that emphasize openness
and transparency to improve public awareness of the activities of
government, and enable others to share in the benefits provided
by the use of space.4 6
This idea-that openness and transparency are essential to prevent
mistrust-is nothing new, but it stands in stark contrast with NSPO6,
which seems to have sown the seeds of mistrust. In fact, NSPlO reads
almost like a response to NSPO6, saying to the world, "you can still trust
the [United States]."
Although NSPlO does provide that nations have the right to explore
and use space for national and homeland security activities,47 it speaks
solely to defense and deterrence. There is no suggestion that the United
States may unilaterally deny any other nation access to space. In
addition, there is no suggestion that the United States would oppose the
development of new legal regimes that limit U.S. militarization of
space. Perhaps the removal of this language suggests that the United
States may now be amenable to an amendment to the OST that imposes
43. National Space Policy of the United States, June 28, 2010 [hereinafter NSPl0],
availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national spacepolicy_6-28- 10.pdf.
44. Id. at 3.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. "All nations have the right to explore and use space for peaceful purposes, and for
the benefit of all humanity, in accordance with international law. Consistent with this principle,
'peaceful purposes' allows for space to be used for national and homeland security activities."
Id. The "peaceful purposes" language is a reference to the Outer Space Treaty.
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a stricter regime of arms control in space. The possibility of such an
amendment is discussed in infra Part V.
While NSP1O is not a complete reversal from NSPO6, it is a very
important step in the right direction. NSP06 largely ignored the
fundamental importance of cooperation and trust embedded in the OST.
Recall that the OST was signed with the purpose of avoiding a Cold
War-era mentality in space. NSPO6 pushed U.S. space policy back
towards the Cold War-era mentality of mistrust, and while the purpose
of NSPO6 was to increase U.S. national security, it may have had the
opposite effect. 48
With advances in technology, space is becoming increasingly
important. However, while the United States must endeavor to protect
its investment in space, the concerns that prompted the OST in the first
place should not be forgotten. The new technological and political
climate necessitates more than the platitudes contained in the OST.49

V. THREATS IN

SPACE, BUT

No

IMMEDIATE AGGRESSION

In peace, space systems are a key element of deterrence. In war,
space systems enhance combat effectiveness, reduce casualties and
minimize equipment loss. Space systems have thus become integral to
U.S. national security. However, trends including technology
proliferation, accessibility to space, and foreign knowledge about U.S.
space systems have made U.S. space systems increasingly vulnerable.5 0
Indeed, given the U.S. terrestrial military power, and the U.S. military's
reliance on space systems, an attack against those systems may be an
attractive option to the nation's enemies.5 1 In July 2000, for example,
the Xinhua news agency reported that the Chinese military was
developing methods and strategies for defeating the U.S. military in a
high-tech and space-based future war.52 It noted: "For countries that
could never win a war by using the method of tanks and planes,
attacking the U.S. space system may be an irresistible and most
tempting choice."5 Therefore, the United States has a significant
interest in protecting itself in a measured way against a surprise attack
48. See Harper, supra note 7, at 698-99.
49. Id. at 686.
50. Tom Wilson, Threats to United States Space Capabilities, Prepared for the
Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, 5
(2001), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/2001/nssmo/article05.
pdf.
5 1. Id.
52. Id. (citing Al Santoli, Beying Describes How to Defeat U.S. in High-Tech War, 331
CHINA REFORM MONITOR 10 (Sept. 12, 2000)).

53.

Id.
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against its space systems in what has been famously labeled a "Space
Pearl Harbor." 54
There are now an increasing variety of methods for impeding or
destroying space systems, and technology that may be used to attack
space systems is spreading across the globe.55 Kinetic energy ASATs,
such as the one used to destroy the defunct Chinese weather satellite,
are perhaps the most likely to be deployed. These weapons destroy
satellites either by the physical force of a direct impact, or by passing
near to the satellite and detonating an exploding fragmentation device.
Directed energy ASATs that utilize either laser or particle beams are
also being developed, though there are certain technical difficulties that
must be overcome before their use will be practical. A particularly
interesting directed energy ASAT being developed involves redesigning
a shoulder-mounted gun to fire an anti-satellite laser beam from a basic
rifle.58 Nuclear warheads may also be used to destroy many satellites at
once in the original blast and ensuing magnetic pulse, or to drastically
reduce their life from many years to months or weeks, due to the
radiation penetrating the satellite. 59 Nevertheless, except for China's
takedown of one of its own defunct weather satellites by an unarmed
missile, to date there have been no reported attacks against any nation's
space infrastructure.
Space systems are divided into three segments: the space segment
consists of the satellites themselves; the ground segment controls the
system; and electromagnetic links connect the space and ground
segments.60 To the extent that space systems are at risk, the ground
segment, and the electromagnetic links are far more vulnerable than the
space segment.61 In fact, the threat of attack against the space segment

54.

See COMM'N TO ASSESS U.S. NAT'L SEC. SPACE MGMT. & ORG., REP. OF THE COMM'N

To ASSESS U.S. NAT'L SEC. MGMT. & ORG. (2001) (coining the phrase "Space Pearl Harbor" in
reference to potential U.S. vulnerability to a surprise attack against space assets), available at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/space20010111.pdf.
55. Wilson, supra note 50, at 5.
56. William Spacy, Assessing the Military Utility of Space-Based Weapons, in SPACE
WEAPONS: ARE THEY NEEDED? 157, 173 (John Logsdon & Gordon Adams eds., 2003), available
at http://www.gwu.edu/-spi/assets/docs/SecuritySpace Volume.Final.pdf.
57. Id. at 181-82.
58. Laser Diode Assembly For Use In A Small Arms Transmitter (filed Nov. 8, 1999),
available at http://www.wipo.int/pctdb/en/wo.jsp?WO=1999042783 (patent application for "[a]
laser diode assembly for use in a small arms laser transmitter (ASAT) which may be affixed to
the stock of a rifle such as an MI6 used by a soldier in training with a multiple integrated laser
engagement system (MILES).").
59. Phillip J. Baines, Prospects for "Non-Offensive" Defenses in Space, Center for
Nonproliferation Studies Occasional Paper No. 12, at 35-36.
60. Id. at 31.
61. Id.at33.
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of space systems is relatively low. 62 Nevertheless, as evidenced by the
development of ASATs by many countries, including China, the space
segment cannot be completely ignored from a defense perspective.
Indeed, as technology improves, satellites will become more vulnerable
to direct attack.
There are many "non-offensive" strategies that can make satellites
less vulnerable, and some of these strategies are already being employed
today.6 3 These strategies include denial and deception techniques, which
are techniques that make it harder for enemies to track satellites; 64
hardening and shielding techniques that make satellites better able to
weather an attack;6 5 maneuvering techniques that allow satellites to
avoid attack;6 6 and finally redundancy, dispersion, and deployment
techniques, which involve the building of space systems that can
function even where part of the system is damaged.6 7 Use of these
strategies can reduce the need for weaponizing space, though they may
be insufficient to fully protect space systems as ASATs become more
advanced.

VI.

SUGGESTION: AMEND THE

OST

Because succeeding presidents can easily amend executive policy,
and because their directives are not binding on other nations, the OST
should be amended to incorporate many of the principles exemplified
by NSP10. This would create a new, stronger regime of space law
capable of handling the new technological and political climate of the
twenty-first century. Capitalizing on the current willingness of the U.S.
government to at least consider changes that impact the militarization of
space now will constrain future leaders who wish to enact policy that
may stimulate a dangerous space race.
Under Article XV of the OST, any signatory nation may propose an
amendment to the OST,6 8 and a proposed amendment will be passed on
acceptance by a majority of the member nations.69 However, such
amendments are binding only on nations who vote in favor of the
amendment, or who accept the amendment after it has been passed. 70 It
is important, therefore, that proposed amendments actually be accepted
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 39-45.
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 41-42.
Id. at 42-45.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. XV.
Id
Id.
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by the major players (in particular the United States, Russia, and
China). Any amendment not accepted by these space powers will have
little effect. Nevertheless, the current political climate may be ready for
the OST to be amended, and the time is thus ripe to consider such
matters. What follows is a series of suggestions for how the OST can be
amended to protect the peace of outer space.
First, in order to protect national interests in space and avoid a
relapse into a Cold War-style arms race in space, the OST should be
amended to include a principle of transparency as espoused by NSP10,
and to provide specific implementations of this principle. Although the
OST promotes cooperation in the exploration and use of space, it
provides no mechanism for countering mistrust. As space becomes
more important, the seeds of mistrust are likely to grow (as they have
been). Enforcing a more rigorous principle of transparency will help
counter this mistrust. The OST actually already provides for a modicum
of transparency.7 1 Article XII provides that "[a]ll stations, installations,
equipment and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies
shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a
basis of reciprocity." 72 Nevertheless, such vague hopes that nations will
keep their space systems open to others is unlikely to be effective,
especially given the increasing economic and strategic importance of
space. Moreover, unlike the prohibition on military installations in
Article IV, Article XII does not apply to satellites. A much more precise
and rigorous set of procedures (and one that incorporates space objects
other than celestial bodies) should be put in place to ensure
transparency. The exact contours of such procedures are a matter for
serious debate; the need for these procedures is not.
Second, the OST should be amended to explicitly allow the use of
only defensive military structures in space. As space becomes more and
more important, nations may find defensive military structures
necessary to protect satellites against enemy ASATs. Stockpiling of
offensive weaponry in space, however, is unnecessary, and may
ultimately lead to a Cold War-style arms race. Although offensive
capabilities may protect a nation's investment in space because of the
deterrent effect, the cost of such deterrence is too high. Allowing
defensive military systems will give nations the ability to protect their
investment and interests in space, without spurring a dangerous arms
build-up in space. From a political point of view, clarifying that
defensive systems will be permitted in space may induce nations with
significant interest in installing such systems to agree to an amendment
that would also prohibit them from installing offensive weapons.
71. Jakhu, supra note 2, at 54.
72. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. XII.
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In order for this amendment to be effective, the distinction between
offensive and defensive weapons must be made clear. As discussed
earlier with regard to the "peaceful purposes" mantra, ambiguity begets
confusion and abuse. Naturally, intent should play some sort of role
here-a weapon in space intended to be used to attack enemy assets will
be an offensive weapon under any definition. Still,.intent is often hard
to determine, and it would be absurd to allow nations to develop
potentially dangerous space weapons, merely on their word that they do
not intend to use such weapons offensively. Even if spacefaring nations
were to develop weapons with no intent to use them offensively, the
temptation to do so may arise after they are already in place. Therefore,
some sort of technical limitations are necessary for this amendment to
have the desired effect. These limitations should allow these weapons to
take out enemy ASATs without the range or destructive power to be
effective against a terrestrial target. A consequence of allowing such
defensive weapons is that they could potentially be used as ASATs
themselves, but this concern can be taken care of by the ASAT ban
discussed later in this section.73
Third, the amendment should explicitly require a U.N. vote prior to
the exclusion of a nation from space. Although the OST arguably
prohibits unilateral action in excluding a nation from space-recall, the
freedom of action principle of Article I provides that all nations have
the right to explore and use space-this prohibition is far too
ambiguous. NSPO6 capitalized on this ambiguity and authorized the
United States to unilaterally exclude adversaries from space. Requiring
a U.N. vote would stop any nation from dominating space by
controlling who has access. Of course, there may be times when waiting
for a U.N. vote would be impractical. In times of war, for instance,
timely control of an adversary's access to space may be necessary. The
amendment may therefore allow nations to unilaterally exclude others
from space only in the event of an actual attack, or where an attack is
imminent.
Finally, the amendment would prohibit the use and development of
ASATs. The freedom of space principle has been weakened by NSPO6.
An amendment to the OST banning the development and use of ASATs
would restore and enhance the principle of freedom of space and would
serve to protect satellites in space without resort to military means. It
would also ameliorate the very real risk that space surrounding the
Earth's atmosphere will become littered with debris that may interfere
with the operation of satellites orbiting Earth.7 4 Of all of the proposed
73. The proposed amendment prohibits both the use and development of ASATs. See
infra Part VI. The "use" language would apply not just to devices designed to act primarily as
anti-satellite weapons but also to defensive weapons that may have such capabilities.
74. For a discussion on the space debris problem, see Jakhu, supra note 2, at 95-97. See
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amendments, this one may also have the most support from the U.S.
government, as President Obama has expressed a desire for an ASAT
ban.75 It may also be the hardest to achieve, as there are many ways to
destroy or disable a satellite. Still, with a firm ASAT ban in place, the
international political cost of using such a device may well stop nations
from deploying ASATs. Moreover, nations with substantial space assets
(such as the United States) will be able to rest a little easier knowing
that international law protects those assets, and will therefore be less
likely to take matters into their own hands.
VII. CONCLUSION
While the United States has reason to prepare for an attack on its
space assets in the future, there is little evidence of real risk of such an
attack today. Space is vast enough to allow for both international,
peaceful cooperation, and lucrative commercial activities. The proposed
amendments to the OST will best focus the United States, and the other
signatory nations, on this goal. There should be greater accountability,
and more international cooperation, among the signatory nations. The
future of humankind may depend, in some measure, on a peaceful
resolution of these issues. The non-military core of the OST should be
reaffirmed, and should specifically ban all offensive weapons, in
addition to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, while
allowing defensive military use of space. The use and development of
ASATs should be categorically prohibited. A U.N. vote should be
required before any nation is excluded from space during peacetime.
Perhaps most importantly, transparency should become front and center
to international efforts to avoid an arms race in space. It is safer and
more logical to take the path to peace. If left unchecked, unilateralist
policies exemplified by NSPO6 (and renounced by NSP 10) will threaten
the peace that the OST helped create. It is not too late, and the time to
seize the moment is now.

also Lucinda R. Roberts, OrbitalDebris:Another Pollution Problemfor the InternationalLegal
Community, 11 FLA. J. INT'L L. 613 (1997).
75.
See THERESA HITCHENS, SAVING SPACE: THREAT PROLIFERATION AND MITIGATION 16
(2009). Note, however, that the language suggesting that the President favored such a ban has
been removed from the White House website and replaced with a vague pronouncement. Id.
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